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ABSTRACT 
Under the leadership of the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), the military is undergoing transformation to more effectively counter the 
asymmetric threat of non-state terrorists and extremists in the "long war."  After five 
years, however, one component of national security strategy is visibly unfulfilled: 
military pursuit of terrorists and extremists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of 
offensive military efforts outside of areas designated as combat zones creates the 
impression that the long war has stalled. Overt offensive military operations targeting 
non-state actors may advance the counterterrorism mission and serve as a deterrent.   
 This thesis identifies and analyzes four major constraints on the conduct of such 
operations:    legal concerns about the use of force, use of the CIA for covert paramilitary 
activities, limits on USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces, and civilian and military 
leaders' aversion to risk.  It describes the historical, bureaucratic and cultural causes of 
the constraints, concluding with recommendations to allow the US government and the 
US military to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists with overt offensive military 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense’s 
twenty year strategy to defeat non-state violent extremists, a small but important change 
was made to the title of the United States’ current conflict against terrorists and 
extremists.1  The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is now called the "long war." With the 
new name, the government acknowledges the conflict as a protracted struggle that will 
last decades.2   
The enemy in the long war, besides Al Qaeda, includes all violent extremist 
groups that cooperate and support the goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate. The 
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) provides an 
even more general definition of violent extremists:   
Extremists are those who (1) oppose—in principle and practice—the right 
of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and (2) 
support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist ideological 
purposes.3   
The recognition that the long war is a new type of conflict against a new type of 
enemy calls for a new strategy. 4   The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the policy 
debate on how to best conduct the long war by examining a neglected but promising 
component of US military strategy: interdicting non-state terrorist and extremist groups                                                  
1 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2006); available from www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf; accessed 6 February 2006. 
2 Although not explicitly stated in the QDR, the Department of Defense states elsewhere that the war 
will likely last for decades. Defenselink; available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060123_3984.html; accessed 2 September 2006.  
3 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006) on page 3 further defines the enemy as "a transnational movement of extremist 
organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters—which have in common 
that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. The Al Qa’ida Associated Movement 
(AQAM), comprised of al Qa’ida and affiliated extremists, is the most dangerous present manifestation of 
such extremism. Certain other violent extremist groups also pose a serious and continuing threat." 
4 Because the US military associates the two types of groups, this thesis considers both terrorists and 
extremists as enemies, and uses the terms, not interchangeably, but in conjunction with one another. The 
US government does not currently have a single uniform definition of violent extremism, and departments 
and agencies vary in their ideas of what exactly constitutes a violent extremist. If and how extremists are 
connected to terrorists is complicated. The Government Accountability Office treats the groups as having 
close interconnections in Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism 
(Washington, DC:  US General Accountability Office, September 2005); available from www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-852; accessed 5 July 2006. 
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outside of designated combat zones.5 The thesis focuses on the option of military pursuit 
of terrorists and extremists through overt offensive operations in areas where the US 
military has not begun ground operations, in areas not conceived as "combat zones."6      
For a nation state to develop an effective new strategy against a symmetric enemy 
is difficult enough. To find an effective strategy against asymmetric non-state extremist 
groups is even more challenging.  The 2006 National Security Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism discusses countering non-state groups as well as nation states.7  After five 
years of fighting against Al Qaeda and its associated networks, with the President's 
explicit declaration that the US would attack and destroy terrorists throughout the world, 
one might ask why, to all appearances, the United States military has not yet pursued 
overt offensive military operations against extremists outside of combat zones.   
This thesis examines what the author considers to be the primary constraints that 
have thus far prevented such operations from being conducted. It argues that a critical 
component of the war against non-state terrorists and extremists is the option of using 
offensive military operations to pursue terrorists in countries where they may feel safe, in 
areas that are not combat zones. If operations like the ones explored in this thesis were 
considered acceptable, the US would have more flexibility in targeting and interdicting 
non-state extremists as a component of national security policy.  A long-term offensive 
strategy against terrorists and extremists, one that follows them wherever they go, would  
 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the relationship between this work and ongoing plans for the evolution of 
national security strategy, see the conclusion of Chapter VII. 
6 What constitutes a "war zone," a "combat zone," a "conflict zone" or a "hazardous duty area" 
involves distinctions based on various factors, some discussed in Chapter III, others not directly relevant to 
this thesis. For the sake of simplicity, the term "combat zone" is used to designate all areas of conflict 
where American military forces are deployed. "Areas other than combat zones" refers to places where the 
US is not engaged in hostilities with the nation-state government. By this common-sense definition, US 
troops stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq are in combat zones; those in Germany and Great Britain are not. 
The basic definition for legal purposes, to include military pay and jurisdiction, is based on Title 10 of the 
US Code.  In the context of this thesis, the focus is on areas that are not considered hazardous duty, combat 
or war zones. 
7 National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006): 10.  
As the fighting continues in Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans continue to debate the appropriate strategy 
for asymmetric war. Questions include whether the US should continue emphasizing military efforts to 
target extremist groups directly, or should take a less direct approach based on the belief that that 
eliminating the underlying causes of terrorism requires something more than military effort.  The National 
Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism incorporates both approaches. The US government struggles to 
find the right balance between direct and indirect efforts.   
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ensure continuity in US policy over the course of the long war and might increase the 
chances of success, just as the strategy of containment during the Cold War led to the 
demise of the Soviet Union.8  
A. TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS AS CRITICAL TARGETS IN THE LONG 
WAR 
 Political scientists Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, who see a slowdown in 
the trend of fundamentalist Islamist control of governments, suggest that Islamic 
extremists can only seize power on a small scale, as in remote towns and valleys.9  
However, they do not consider just how little area an extremist group needs to launch an 
operation like the attack of 9/11.  A town the size of Fallujah or a valley the size of the 
Pankisi Gorge may be large enough to provide militants with the trainees and resources 
necessary for a terrorist attack like 9/11.   
 John Arquilla writes that a protracted war is the wrong strategy for the US 
because the longer non-state extremists operate freely, the more likely they are to obtain a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD).10  This perspective underlines how important it is 
for the US government to have a variety of options in pursuing terrorists and extremists.  
Offensive military operations outside of declared war zones, in the view of this thesis, 
should be considered among those options.11  Extremist groups' safe havens are a threat 
to US national security, because the areas under extremists' control may shelter efforts to 
attack the US or obtain WMDs.  These threats may warrant using US military forces 
against extremist centers of gravity in countries whose national government is unable to 
interdict or disrupt them.   
B. MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF COMBAT ZONES: SOME 
CHALLENGES AND ADVANTAGES  
This section presents a brief introduction to some of the challenges and 
advantages of overt offensive military operations against terrorists and extremists outside 
                                                 
8 See Mark E. Kosnik, "The Military Response to Terrorism," Naval War College Review (Spring 
2000): 13-34. Kosnik suggests that maintaining continuity throughout a campaign is critical to success. 
9 Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow of the Prophet (London: Praeger, 
2004).  
10 John Arquilla, “In the Fight Against Terrorism, The Long War is the Wrong War,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, 16 July 2006.   
11 For a description of the direct and indirect dimensions of US strategy, see National Security 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 7.  
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of combat zones as part of the long war.  Such offensive military operations are difficult 
for a variety of reasons.  At the international level, an advantage of offensive operations 
against terrorists and extremists is that such operations, while contributing to US national 
strategy, might simultaneously support and assist partner governments to engage non 
state actors more fully on their own.  The challenge arises because for the US to engage 
in such operations, the military and diplomatic corps would need a foundation of 
agreements between the US and its partner governments.12  
At the military level, it is hard to counter non-state actors because they operate 
globally but are loosely structured as a confederation of organizations.  Terrorists have no 
“Moscow center" to control and synchronize their efforts the way the Soviet Union 
controlled its allies and proxies.13  Operations against them must be addressed on a case 
by case basis. Thus, implementing a comprehensive strategy for offensive military 
operations outside of designated combat zones is difficult, because the strategy may not 
uniformly engage all non-state groups or address the concerns of each individual host 
nation state. 14   
In offensive operations, military doctrine and strategy call for overwhelming 
force.15  However, for the US to effectively counter non-state actors with offensive 
military operations outside of combat zones, raids by austere Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) or conventional forces tailored in a similar fashion may be the best option. 
Subsequent chapters argue that national security strategy may be better served by more 
use of a flexible, nimble and extremely responsive force unlike the heavy forces that 
                                                 
12 Proposals for such agreements would require specific and detailed consideration by appropriate 
experts in diplomacy and international law. The issue is discussed in later chapters, although consideration 
of the content of such agreements lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
13 The use of the cold war term “Moscow Center” in this context seems to originate with Professor 
Glenn Robinson of the Naval Postgraduate School. Robinson proposes that the main drawback to the world 
wide caliphate is the lack of a central mechanism (no Moscow Center) to enforce the adherence of other 
religious leaders who may think themselves better suited to govern.     
14 The best known offensive US operation along these lines was Operation Eagle Claw (sometimes 
referred to as Rice Bowl), the attempted rescue of US embassy personnel from Iran in 1980, discussed in 
later chapters.  Continued offensive operations in multiple countries to interdict and destroy non-state 
extremist groups would be very different from this single operation.  Because each operation to pursue 
terrorists or extremists would be unique, measurements of operational effectiveness will have to be 
reassessed.  Measures of operational effectiveness may have to be reassessed because they tend to be based 
on World War II-era symmetric concepts. Whether or not the US is "winning" today is more focused on 
international public opinion and the support for extremist groups.  
15 The Powell doctrine is discussed in Chapter VI. 
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constitute the bulk of the Army's force structure.  If so, a challenge to the military and its 
civilian leadership will be to direct the shift, both conceptually and practically, to a new 
form of warfare that in many ways may seem more "primitive" than today's model of 
large forces using high-tech "stand off" weapons to overwhelm the enemy with "shock 
and awe."16  
C. PURSUIT OF TERRORISTS AND EXTREMISTS: THE ROLE OF 
USSOCOM 
The Congressional Research Service, in a study of military operations in the 
GWOT, reports that all operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq as of 2005 were other 
than offensive operations.17  However, news reports of attacks against Al Qaeda senior 
leaders suggest that the CIA has conducted paramilitary operations outside of combat 
zones as part of the National Counterterrorism Strategy.18  In other words, it appears that 
the US is engaged in covert, offensive pursuit of terrorists by agencies other than the 
military.  
After the 9/11 attacks, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was 
designated as the lead DoD organization in the GWOT.  Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld believed USSOCOM was a natural choice to head the GWOT.  USSOCOM's 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) have the skills, equipment and established relationships 
with the CIA and the Department of State to locate, target, track and destroy non-state 
networks.  Perhaps most importantly, USSOCOM is the only transregional command 
                                                 
16  Stand off weapons are sent to a target while the delivery vehicle remains far distant. They are the 
opposite of foot soldiers, who must be relatively close to engage their targets.    
17 See Andrew Feickert, U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, 
Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005); available 
from www.crsdocuments.com; accessed 15 July 2006. Feickert describes these operations as military 
assistance, civil affairs and information operations.  In no case have US military forces, unilaterally or in 
conjunction with other nation's forces, directly attacked non-state extremists outside of combat zones.  US 
SOF operations in Basilan are considered by many the most successful military operations outside of a 
combat zone. There the efforts are devoted to training, advising and assisting the Philippine military against 
non-state extremists.       
18 News reports state that the CIA was instrumental in leading the Northern Alliance prior to the 
introduction of US SOF personnel.  Reports also claim that the CIA attacked Al Qaeda leaders using 
unmanned aerial vehicles on at least five occasions. The press has not reported any such attacks organized 
by the military.  An excellent account is in Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA 
Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005).   
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with operational forces.19 In interviews with DoD officials, the author was told that 
Rumsfeld chose USSOCOM as the lead command because USSOCOM has both a global 
reach and control of combat forces. Whatever Rumsfeld's reasoning, his designation of 
USSOCOM as the lead in the long war put SOF on the front line for missions outside of 
combat zones. 
Since then, USSOCOM has received larger budgets, more personnel and more 
operational authorities.  Nonetheless, to date no offensive military operations have been 
conducted by USSOCOM or any other Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq.20 Five years into what analyst Thomas X. Hammes calls 
a new type of warfare, military operations are still conducted within the confines of 
traditional US fights against nation state enemies.21   
The role of USSOCOM and the Special Operations community in the long war is 
shifting, but perhaps not quickly enough.  In the context of US national security strategy, 
and given the potential utility of military pursuit of terrorists and extremists in areas 
outside of combat zones, it would seem important to understand why such operations are 
not taking place.22   Offensive military operations in pursuit of terrorists conducted 
outside of combat zones will not in and of themselves end the long war, but they might 
make a difference.  This thesis begins the discussion by offering a detailed assessment of 
four major constraints on overt offensive operations in areas other than combat zones, 
suggesting ways of overcoming these constraints and reasons for doing so, in the belief 
that the concept of such operations should be incorporated, as an option for the military, 
into national strategy.  
 
                                                 
19 The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has a similar global authority, but it has no forces.  
Similarly, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is transregional, but while it does control 
aircraft, it does not control combat forces. 
20 The role of USSOCOM and the Geographical Combatant Commands are discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
21 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2006) describes the current 
conflict against non-state extremist groups as "fourth generation warfare" and new to the US military. 
22 Examination and discussion of locations where it might be appropriate to conduct such operations is 
the responsibility of the National Command Authority.  Although the general concept presented here 
assumes that such operations would be confined to areas where the nation-state government cannot 
effectively counter non-state extremist groups, detailed consideration of the appropriate limits of the 
concept is beyond the scope of this work. 
7 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The concepts discussed in this thesis emerge from several different sources and 
methodologies. They originate with the author's experience as a Special Forces Officer 
assigned to the European Command (EUCOM) between 2001 and 2004, and discussions 
with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and other military officers in the course of interagency operations.  
The major constraints on conducting offensive operations outside of designated combat 
zones were identified through a survey of the literature on national security, the war on 
terror, and irregular warfare.  The concepts were explored and further solidified in face to 
face interviews, averaging about an hour each, with 34 military and civilian experts, 
including officials in the Department of Defense (DoD), the CIA, DoS, and 
nongovernmental civilian experts, along with numerous telephone interviews and e-mail 
inquiries.  The comments reported in this thesis without attribution come from interview 
subjects who spoke on the condition of confidentiality. Face to face interview subjects are 
listed in the Annex.  
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The argument is presented in seven chapters.  Chapter II presents a brief summary 
and overview of the four constraints.  Chapters III, IV, V and VI examine the four 
constraints in greater detail, elaborating on each and discussing their root causes. Chapter 
VII offers recommendations for legal, policy and organizational changes to allow 
USSOCOM to conduct offensive military operations outside of designated combat zones 
in the interest of providing policy makers with more options in their prosecution of the 
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II. CONSTRAINTS ON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS:  FOUR 
MAIN FACTORS  
“Dead or alive.”  “With us or against us.”  After the attack of 9/11, the rhetoric of 
American leaders was fierce.  The US invasion of Afghanistan was presented as the first 
step in a campaign to seek out and destroy Al Qaeda and supporting terrorist networks.  
The US had the backing of almost the entire world, and the American public was 
emotionally prepared to respond in an unprecedented way to an unprecedented attack.    
A senior DoD official reports in an interview with the author that when Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld asked the USSOCOM commander for a list of terrorist targets to 
retaliate against on September 25, 2001, General Charles Holland replied that 
USSOCOM could not retaliate because there was no “actionable” intelligence for them to 
act upon.23  The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism states that the 
US will “[a]ttack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause the enemies to be 
incapable or unwilling to attack the U.S. homeland, allies, or interests…”24 Five years 
later, the lack of overt military efforts against terrorists outside of Iraq and Afghanistan 
points to a failure to execute this component of the long war.  If attacks by non-state 
actors present such a great threat to America’s national security, why is there such a gap 
between national policy and military operations?25  
This thesis focuses on the four most important constraints that prevent the US 
military, with USSOCOM as its lead in the war on terrorism, from conducting offensive 
                                                 
23 Interview by the author with Robert Andrews, Principal Assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.  The dearth of specific information on Al Qaeda leaders and 
facilities provides a reasonable explanation for the absence of more strategic attacks against Al Qaeda and 
related networks. The development of "actionable intelligence" is discussed in Chapter V. 
24 Offensive operations are explicitly discussed in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism, 6, which would seem to indicate that the military will be responsible for them.  However, efforts 
in nations other than Afghanistan and Iraq appear to involve little more than support and assistance 
missions to the military and police, along with bomb and missile attacks against Al Qaeda leaders. These 
attacks, presumably conducted by the CIA, are discussed in Chapter IV. 
25 Although terrorism is not explicitly declared America's single greatest threat, terrorist attacks and 
fear of terrorist control of a weapon of mass destruction are discussed at length in the National Security 
Strategy and are clearly high priorities for US policymakers. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 
the 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism  both emphasize asymmetric and non-
kinetic means to defeat terrorists and extremists.  Because the need for military force has been articulated 
as part of the national security strategy, the lack of emphasis on direct action against terrorists outside war 
zones is puzzling. 
10 
operations against terrorists and extremists outside of combat zones. This chapter briefly 
introduces the four constraints, which are examined in further detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
A. THE FIRST CONSTRAINT:  LEGAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF 
FORCE   
There are a variety of legal concerns about operations against non-state actors 
outside of combat zones.  Chief among them is the common but mistaken perception that 
any use of military force in another sovereign nation constitutes an act of war. 
Traditionally, because interjected forces were directed at a nation’s government, the 
projection of military force into another sovereign nation has been seen as an act of war.  
However, the evolution of non-state actors (including state-sponsored and independent 
groups) creates a new dynamic in how the use of force is affected by international law.   
The 9/11 attacks and subsequent attention to terrorism changed expectations of 
how America should deal with non-state threats.  Developing a consensus to use military 
force against non-state actors is difficult because of the political ramifications of such 
actions.  Although most international agreements, including the UN charter, originated 
when non-state actors were significantly less capable, there are many precedents and 
arguments for using military force against non-state actors.  Further consideration of 
relevant international and domestic legal concerns about the use of force is presented in 
Chapter III.  
B. THE SECOND CONSTRAINT:  USE OF THE CIA FOR COVERT 
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES 
The second constraint on the use of military force to pursue terrorists outside of 
combat zones comes from the tradition of using the CIA for covert military-type 
operations as part of US foreign policy.  The US legal code (Title 50) allows the 
President to use the CIA in covert operations by issuing a Presidential finding, called a 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) in which he can direct the CIA (or other agencies) 
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to conduct activities to achieve American political objectives.26  Reaching consensus 
domestically and achieving international diplomatic agreements for direct and overt use 
of the military are slow, complex and exhaustive processes, often easier to forgo in favor 
of indirect or covert approaches. The government’s reticence to incur political and 
diplomatic repercussions by deploying US military forces overtly lead to reliance on the 
CIA for covert paramilitary operations, sometimes  along with the use of surrogate forces 
to accomplish US objectives.27     
The complex relationship between the Congress and the President when military 
forces are deployed (discussed in Chapter III), along with the challenges of convincing 
the international community to support (or at least not oppose) the use of military force, 
may make an indirect option like a covert CIA operation more appealing to a President.  
And because the CIA could act more quickly and efficiently than the military, in the last 
part of the twentieth century, the US executive branch increased its use of covert and 
military-type actions.28  Furthermore, if covert operations fail, the government can try to 
maintain "plausible deniability."        
Using the CIA against non-state actors may seem a quick and easy solution in 
bureaucratic terms, but one must also consider the failed states and ungoverned regions 
where host nation forces and even surrogate forces may be unable to effectively counter 
                                                 
26 See Title 50, Chapter 15, subchapter III, section 413b, "Presidential approval and reporting of 
covert actions," for guidelines for the authorization of covert operations.  Although the President is bound 
to report these findings in a timely manner to the Congress, the limited scope and secretive nature of the 
reporting makes approving the use of the CIA for covert paramilitary operations much faster and less 
visible than the use of the military for a similar operation.  See the Cornell Law School Legal Information 
Institute, available from http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00000413---b000-
.html; accessed 20 September 2006.  Another reason these operations draw less attention is that Presidential 
findings are not published in the Federal Register.  See Harold C. Relyea,  Presidential Directives: 
Background and Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 7, 2005): 13; 
available from www.crsdocuments.com; accessed 23 July 2006.    
27 On problems with relying on covert operations, a topic discussed in Chapter V, see the so-called 
Tower Commission Report, Report of the President's Special Review Board (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1987), II-5. On the use of surrogate forces, see below, Chapter IV, fn 80.   
28 The efficient and streamlined operations of the CIA in comparison to a military operation were 
described to the author by a DoD liaison officer to the CIA. In the case of the Iran-Contra affair, the covert 
operations were run not by the CIA but by the National Security Council. 
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today’s more capable non-state terrorists and extremists.29  The use of the CIA for 
paramilitary operations and the advantages and disadvantages of covert vs. overt 
operations against terrorists are elaborated in Chapter IV. 
C. THE THIRD CONSTRAINT:  LIMITS ON USSOCOM AND SOF FORCES 
Because USSOCOM is the lead command in the long war, it makes sense to see 
Special Operations Forces as the best candidates for overt ground-based operations in 
pursuit of terrorists and extremists in countries other than Afghanistan and Iraq.30 
However, USSOCOM has not been notably active in that regard.  A variety of reasons, 
discussed in Chapter V, have led to an over commitment of SOF forces, both in terms of 
the type of missions they are assigned and the duration of those missions. The 
overextension of SOF forces creates a third constraint on offensive military operations 
against terrorists and extremists. 
Since World War II, SOF forces have been used mostly on the periphery of 
conventional conflicts, in a limited capacity and usually unconnected to the main military 
effort.31 Except in World War II, their most notable contributions were in training and 
supporting the military forces of countries fighting communism.  In some places, like El 
Salvador in the 1980s and the Philippines today, SOF forces work as military advisors.32 
Elsewhere, like Laos, they were supporting elements to the CIA.33 In combat zones, as 
force multipliers in Korea and Vietnam, SOF forces trained regular and irregular forces to 
                                                 
29 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper, "Efforts by C.I.A. Fail in Somalia, Officials Charge," New York 
Times, 8 June 2006; available from  
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F00617FD3E550C7B8CDDAF0894DE404482 ;  
accessed 20 August 2006. The article discusses purported CIA use of Somali warlords as surrogates against 
the Islamic government.  
30 Special operations are defined as operations "conducted by specially organized, trained, and 
equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological 
objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas." Cited in 
Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 137 fn 20. 
31 In World War II, the predecessors to today's Special Operations Forces engaged in a variety of 
operations usually closely tied to the main effort, like the First Special Service Force assault on La 
Defensia in Italy. 
32 For an example of how the judicious use of SOF forces made a notable impact with far reaching 
consequences, see Lieutenant Colonel Gregory R. Wilson, "Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines: 'The 
Indirect Approach,'” unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 13 March 2006. 
33 For Special Forces participation in Project White Star, see John Prados, "A Window on The Enemy: 
Keeping an Eye on The Ho Chi Minh Trail," The Veteran, March/April 2003, available from 
http://www.vva.org/TheVeteran /2003_03/window.htm; accessed 13 March 2006.    
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fight the communists.  Their other mission focus has been as highly trained, well-
equipped forces for extremely specialized missions. Commonly-cited examples include 
the Rangers in Korea and the Son Tay raiders in Vietnam.  
Today, some members of the Special Forces community argue (in interviews with 
the author) that SOF force missions can be done by conventional forces and do not 
maximize SOF strategic potential. In fact, much training and advising of the partner 
nation armies in Iraq and Afghanistan, a traditional Special Forces role, is now conducted 
by US conventional forces. Indeed, as an Army training manual notes, "General purpose 
forces are being used extensively in advisory positions, a traditional special operations 
forces (SOF) mission, without having the advantage of specialized training."34  
Meanwhile, the primary mission of SOF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has become the 
apprehension of high and mid-level insurgent leaders.  Employing a high percentage of 
the limited number of SOF forces in such specialized roles precludes their use in direct 
action and other missions, and confining 85 to 90 percent in the Afghan and Iraq theaters 
precludes their use in countries where they might have greater strategic impact.35 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that the current 
distribution of SOF forces is the main reason USSOCOM has not developed the 
capability to conduct offensive operations outside of designated combat zones. 
Congressman Jim Saxton, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Unconventional Threats, says, "SOCOM has concentrated and performed 
magnificently in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has had to neglect to some degree other 
critical areas of the world to execute its urgent combat missions."36  In an interview one 
                                                 
34 "Advising Foreign Forces: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures," Center for Army Lessons 
Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, KS (no. 06-01), January 2006, 23. 
35 Estimates vary, but two of the most credible come from the testimony of Michael Vickers, who 
believes that 90 percent of SOF forces were deployed in 2004.  See Congressional testimony by Michael 
Vickers, Hearing of the Defense Review Terrorism and Radical Islam Gap Panel, 26 October 2005; 
available from http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:3-
iOzPrbAIMJ:www.house.gov/hasc/CDR/index.html+Hearing+of+the+Defense+Review+Terrorism+and+R
adical+Islam+Gap+Panel&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1; accessed 22 February 2006.  USSOCOM itself 
estimates that about 85 percent of SOF forces were deployed in 2005.  See United States Special 
Operations Command, Posture Statement (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 5.  
36 Representative Jim Saxton, Opening Statement to the US House of Representatives Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats, Posture Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget 
Request for the US Special Operations Command, March 8, 2006, available from 
www.house.gov/hasc/schedules; accessed 22 September 2006. 
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USSOCOM senior officer warned, “If we are not careful about how we use SOF forces, 
we can win in Afghanistan and Iraq but lose everywhere else.” These topics and related 
issues are elaborated in Chapter V. 
D. THE FOURTH CONSTRAINT: RISK AVERSION 
The fourth constraint derives from civilian and military decision makers' aversion 
to military risk and failure. Reluctance to use ground forces in offensive operations 
outside of designated combat zones is tied to the paradigm of relying on large military 
contingents in hostile settings and the belief that to succeed, the US military must use 
“overwhelming force” (the Powell doctrine).37   
The paradigm of overwhelming force may be appropriate in circumstances like a 
conventional state to state conflict. The expectation that the US must always strive to 
minimize its own military casualties and to do so must use overwhelming force magnifies 
a failed mission's negative impact on the military, on domestic politics, and on US 
foreign relations.  The reliance on overwhelming force and risk aversion reinforce each 
other.  
Overwhelming force is both a stated principle of military planning and a 
consequence of incorporating large numbers of logistics, support, and contingency forces.  
The expectation that risk will be minimized also affects selection of forces for a mission.  
A mission that is an extremely good fit for SOF forces may entail so much risk that 
military leaders will instead recommend a higher tech but less effective option that does 
not put forces on the ground. Such was the decision to launch a tomahawk missile attack 
on Afghanistan after Al Qaeda operatives attacked the US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.38   
Hesitation to engage in overt military operations against non-state actors outside 
of combat zones may reflect doubts about US military competence, which prevents 
                                                 
37 Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs vol. 71, no. 5 (1 December 
1992), 32. 
38 See the discussion in Chapter VI of President Clinton's recent revelation that military leaders 
opposed his request to send SOF forces into Afghanistan as a response to the attacks.  Fox News Sunday 
website, 24 September 2006, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,215397,00.html; accessed 
24 September 2006.   
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approval of missions considered militarily or politically high risk.39 Operation Eagle 
Claw, the unsuccessful ground mission to rescue American hostages from Iranian radicals 
in 1980, damaged military pride, shook up the Department of Defense and galvanized 
political determination to implement unwelcome structural changes in DoD, resulting in 
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.40 The failed mission and 
ensuing US-Iranian stalemate probably caused President Carter’s 1980 reelection defeat. 
In American society’s zero sum perspective, the repercussions of overt failed 
military missions against Al Qaeda operatives outside of combat zones would reflect 
poorly on the military and might well result in unpleasant internal investigations and 
discomforting Congressional inquiries.  Strategically, attempting and failing such 
missions would demonstrate to the world that the US cannot implement the Bush 
doctrine.  A failure might also give the impression that non-state terrorists are safe 
anywhere that the US is unwilling to invade for reasons short of regime change or 
occupation. 
Ironically, the world's most powerful military has difficulty with small scale 
special operations and a history of failure in these missions.41  Because of failed attempts, 
SOF missions outside of combat zones have a poor reputation. Military and civilian 
                                                 
39 Richard H. Shultz Jr., "Showstoppers," Weekly Standard, 26 January 2004; available from 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/613twavk.asp; retrieved 9 August 
2006.  Schultz discusses how some view SOF forces as pariah cowboys.    
40 James R. Locher, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2002) 
has an extremely detailed description of the multi-sided Congressional battle for military reform that began 
in earnest in 1981.  The impact of Goldwater-Nichols is discussed at length in Chapter V. The military was 
put under extreme scrutiny after the 1980 rescue failure, initially in an investigation directed by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The Congress used the so-called "Holloway Report" to justify 
reforming the military.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rescue Mission Report (Washington, DC.: 
Department of Defense, Special Operations Review Group, 1980); available from 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/cgisirsi.exe/UNQg3Bzfft/x/146370007/123; accessed 6 October 2006.   
41 There are various reasons for these failures.  In the Son Tay raid, there were no prisoners to rescue.  
In the cases of the USS Mayaguez and the attempted Iranian hostage rescue, the missions were poorly 
planned and executed. There are many accounts of these missions. A good single source is Lucien S. 
Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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leaders are reluctant to approve them, fearing the fallout from yet another failure—what 
Richard H. Schultz, Jr., calls the "Somalia syndrome."42 
E. SUMMARY 
Concerns and misconceptions about the moral and legal use of military forces, use 
of the CIA for covert military-type operations, constraints on USSOCCOM and the 
current use of SOF forces, and risk-averse civilian and military leadership:  these 
obstacles impede and prevent the US from offensive pursuit of terrorists and extremists 
outside of combat zones and limits the options of policy makers in the long war.   Better 
understanding these constraints on offensive operations outside combat zones is more 
than an academic pursuit.  It is a step in transforming the military to meet the challenges 
of the 21st century.  The following four chapters examines in more detail the causes and 
nature of the four primary constraints on the execution of offensive operations. 43      
                                                 
42 The "Somalia Syndrome" is where the administration, fearing an embarrassment like the battle of 
Mogadishu, is wary of preemptive special operations. "Showstoppers" presents a different view on why 
SOF forces have not conducted offensive operations.  See Shultz. The analysis in this thesis borrows from 
some of Schultz's points, including the discussion of risk aversion, and differs on other points.   
43 Other factors contribute to the government’s reticence to conduct overt offensive operations outside 
of combat zones, but these four appear most critical.  If all four were rectified, there would be no serious 
constraints on overt offensive military operations in areas other than combat zones. Not discussed in this 
paper, but obviously important, is the question of budgeting for such missions, neglected here because it is 
assumed that a decision to conduct operations would produce the necessary funding. Similarly, concerns 
about international diplomatic relationships fall outside the scope of this thesis.  
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III. LEGAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE 
Overcoming misconceptions that any use of military force in another country is an 
act of war requires examining several distinct but related topics, including aspects of 
international law and the just war tradition and the means of authorizing the use of force 
in the United States. This chapter also presents precedents for the use of force in other 
countries, including historical examples of the use of US military force against non-state 
actors.  
A. JUST WAR TRADITION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The projection of military force into another sovereign nation is considered an act 
of war because the force is usually directed at that nation’s government or seen as a 
violation of state sovereignty.  Military force has been used many times as a means of 
preventing or punishing attacks by non-state actors. The legal basis for military 
operations of this nature is complicated and subject to widely different interpretations.  
An examination of international law and precedent shows sufficient justification for 
offensive military operations outside of combat zones to destroy or disrupt the activities 
of enemy non-state actors.    
The legal framework for employing military force is based upon the conventions, 
traditions, treaties and agreements of international law. Some of the most important legal 
conventions comes from the tradition of "just war," jus ad bellum, which is the moral 
justification supporting a ruler’s use of military force.  The tradition has its roots in the 
fifth century with the writings of St. Augustine.44 The tradition of just war gained 
importance after World War I, when structured international bodies of nation states like 
the League of Nations and the United Nations wielded more influence with 
acknowledged authority to punish violators. The concept of jus ad bellum is important to 
the discussion of offensive operations against terrorists because it is based in self-
                                                 
44 There is a large literature on Just War theory.  For a brief summary, see Douglas P. Lackey, “The 
Ethics of War and Peace,” in The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy, edited by James 
Rachels and Stuart Rachels (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2007), 221-229. 
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defense.45 Essentially, in the just war tradition, a nation is justified in going to war only if 
war is necessary, and self-defense (of one's own state, or of allies) defines necessity.   
Whereas jus ad bellum is the tradition to justify going to war, jus in bello is the 
tradition of using force in an amount proportional to the cause of the war and of making 
an appropriate discriminations in the conduct of warfare between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets (typically, between soldiers and civilians).  Both traditions have been 
incorporated into and serve as the basis of the US military’s law of land warfare.  Most 
military officers are more familiar with the concept of jus in bello, because it affects the 
treatment of enemy combatants and civilians.     
 The concepts of just war and a nation’s right to self defense are embodied in the 
United Nations charter, a normative framework that acknowledges a nation’s right to use 
force in self defense and the UN’s responsibility to intervene and restore order.  Article 
51 of the UN charter determines under what conditions a nation should use military force 
in the context of the international community.46  The use of force in self defense is 
supported by additional United Nations Security Council resolutions.  In this context, the 
three most pertinent were passed after the 9/11 attack. They declare the right to use 
military force in self defense and in opposition to non-state groups like Al Qaeda.  
Resolution 1378 supports international efforts to root out terrorism and opposition to the 
Taliban.47 Resolution 1368 recognizes nation states' inherent right to self-defense in 
accordance with the UN charter, while condemning the 9/11 attacks and urging all  
 
                                                 
45 Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, Marshall Center 
Papers, No. 5 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies, 2002), 21. 
46 Article 51 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security."  Available from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/; 
accessed 6 August 2006. 
47 UN Resolution 1378, "Supporting international efforts to root out terrorism," available from 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; accessed 6 August 2006.  
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nations to bring the perpetrators to justice.48  Resolution 1373 reaffirms the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense as recognized by the UN Charter and Resolution 
1368.49   
 Agreements by the regional organizations for collective defense also support the 
use of force, including Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Charter.  The language and concept of national self-defense and mutual support is found 
also in the Organization of American States (OAS)50 and the Australia, New Zealand and 
United States (ANZUS) treaties.51   
 The main moral and diplomatic issues revolve around what types of actions 
justify the use of preemptive military force against terrorists.52  With the right of self 
defense clearly established, there should be no major moral or legal obstacles to a nation 
state responding militarily to a terrorist group that attacked it.   
 The more controversial topic of pursuing or retaliating against attacks conducted 
by one party who take refuge in a third party's territory has also been addressed.  
According to Michael N. Schmitt of the George C. Marshall European Center for 
Security Studies, US attacks on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan were necessary and 
proportional, in accordance with Just War Theory, because the Taliban government 
defied UN demands that Al Qaeda operatives be turned over.  However, according to 
                                                 
48UN Resolution 1368, "A nation states' inherent right to self-defense in accordance with the UN 
charter," available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; accessed 6 August 2006. 
49 UN Resolution 1373, "Reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as 
recognized by the UN Charter," available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm; accessed 
on 6 August 2006. 
50 The Organization of American States Charter, Article 28 states, “Every act of aggression by a State 
against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political 
independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American 
States.” Available from http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.html; accessed 6 August 2006.  
51 The ANZUS treaty article IV states, “For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the 
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the 
island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the 
Pacific.” Available from http://www.australianpolitics.com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml; accessed on 6 
August 2006.   
52 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), 22. Under appropriate conditions, preemptive attacks are permitted in the just war 
tradition, but so-called "preventative" attacks are generally not.  Preemption is based on evidence that an 
enemy intends to attack and that attack is imminent, whereas "prevention" could apply to just the suspicion 
that the enemy intends to do harm. The reason is that just war theory requires that war be the "last resort," 
and a "preventative" attack does not meet that jus ad bellum criterion. In the eyes of the US administration 
and its critics as well, the US invasion of Iraq was "preventative" but not "preemptive."  
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Schmitt, the general question of pursuing enemies into other nations' territories is less 
well-grounded in international law and tradition.53  For this reason, offensive operations 
with the limited purpose of pursuing independent groups of non-state actors in the 
territory of other nations will require caution and diplomacy. To avoid the perception of 
invading another country's territory will probably require bilateral agreements with the 
partner government. 
B. EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST NON-
STATE ACTORS 
Examples of jus ad bellum in practice provide insights about the use of military 
force against non-state actors.  Historically, military force has been used against non-state 
actors with mixed results.  Non-state groups are generally disrupted by force and then 
either dispersed or eliminated by the nation in which they operate.  In some cases the use 
of force increases legal and diplomatic cooperation among the states arrayed against the 
threats.54  In modern history, the use of military force against non-state actors is 
surprisingly common.  The cases described here illustrate US responses to threats that 
parallel those today:  threats from a non-state actor, with a proven capacity for harm, 
operating in another sovereign country.55   
1. The Caroline Case   
The Caroline case exemplifies an asymmetric attack by a sovereign nation against 
non-state rebels based in another country.  The sovereign nation was Britain, which in 
1837 launched troops from Canada into the US to attack the Caroline, a rebel ship used to 
conduct attacks in Canada.56  The British attack outraged the US, but was later 
determined by both governments to be legal, as the rebels had attacked British interests 
first and the British had asked unsuccessfully for America’s aid in stopping them. It is not 
clear whether the US government was unable or unwilling to end the rebel assaults.  A 
                                                 
53 Schmitt, especially 31-41. 
54 Kosnik discusses how legal actions by partner nations against terrorists increased after the US 
operation Eldorado Canyon against Libya in 1986.   
55 The Caroline Case and the hunt for Pancho Villa are widely recognized as examples of nation state 
pursuit of non-state actors into foreign territory.  The pirates of the Caribbean, however, provide a less 
well-known example. 
56 Schmitt 36. 
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treaty between Britain and the US settling the incident helped establish the precedent of 
"anticipatory self-defense" in international law.57   
2. Pirates in the Caribbean 
Caribbean pirates of the early 1800s are in some ways similar to the networked 
non-state terrorist groups of today. The toll on commercial shipping from pirate attacks 
reached an unacceptable level shortly after the turn of the 19th century. The US used a 
robust naval force to counter the threat to commerce.  Most of the pirates were not state 
sponsored but received safe haven, often in exchange for payment, from nation states that 
controlled Caribbean islands. The US Navy attacked the pirates on their ships at sea and 
while harbored in the territories controlled by other nations.  Pirate raiding was ended by 
military pressure and declining support from other nations in response to American 
diplomatic efforts.58  It is interesting to note that the US attacked and destroyed suspected 
pirate ships without concern about whether that particular ship had attacked American 
interests.  The response to the pirates in the Caribbean is a strong example of destroying 
threats to national interests because of the targets' previous actions, potential threat, and 
possible connection to other known threats.59      
3. The Hunt for Pancho Villa 
In 1915, revolutionary leader Venustiano Carranza seized power in Mexico.  A 
former supporter, Francisco “Pancho” Villa, turned against him and began conducting 
raids in US territory along the Mexican border in retaliation for the US recognition and 
support of Carranza’s regime.  The US military began patrolling the border in an attempt 
to interrupt Villa’s raids. A particularly violent raid in 1916 caused the US to take serious 
action; later that year, Brigadier General Pershing was ordered on a punitive expedition 
                                                 
57 Schmitt, 22. The issue of "anticipatory self-defense" is legally related to preemption and prevention, 
both, as noted above, beyond the scope of this thesis. Eventually the threat to Britain was eliminated by the 
movement's own failure and by efforts of the American government, which saw the rebels as threats to the 
US. See Schmitt, 36.  
58 This case differs from the more well-known Barbary Wars of roughly the same period, because the 
Barbary Wars involved military actions against recognized states in Africa.  See C. S. Forester, The 
Barbary Pirates (New York: Random House, 1953).  Foster chronicles US involvement with the Barbary 
Coast pirates and the use of military force when diplomacy failed.   
59 Richard Wheeler, In Pirate Waters (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969). Wheeler 
describes the naval campaign against the Caribbean pirates in detail. 
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into Mexico to capture or kill Villa.60  The expedition failed and Villa eluded Pershing, 
but he never again threatened the US.  Although Pershing's expedition was unsuccessful, 
it is a clear example of projecting military force into another sovereign nation against a 
non-state actor, much like the current hunt for Osama Bin Laden.61   
4.  Modern Offensive Operations    
The use of military force against non-state actors continued through the last half 
of the 20th century.  During the 1970s, when hostage-taking became more common, two 
cases of nation states using military force against non-state groups stand out as distinct 
precedents:  the Israeli raid on Entebbe, and the US attempt to rescue hostages in Iran.62   
Operation Jonathan, the raid on Entebbe, was conducted by Israeli Special Forces 
at the international airport in Uganda to rescue Israeli citizens taken hostage by two 
Baader-Meinhof Gang and two Palestinian terrorists.63  Uganda’s president gave the 
terrorists minor assistance (permission to land, food, water and communications), but 
they were not state supported by Uganda or any other nation state. The Israeli raid 
succeeded with minimal casualties.  In 1980, a joint US military force tried to rescue 
members of the American embassy held hostage by followers of Ayatollah Khomeni.64 
The mission ended prematurely and disastrously; the president aborted the mission after 
rescuers died in an aircraft collision at a remote staging area in Iran.   
These two examples differ from the three older cases in that the more recent 
operations were hostage rescue rather than punitive expeditions.65 But all provide 
                                                 
60 Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). D’Este gives a 
compelling description of the events that lead to, and Patton’s experiences in, Pershing’s campaign.   
61 In Pershing's case, the US informed the Carranza government of its intent to conduct the expedition 
and received "reluctant approval."  See Joe Griffith, "In Pursuit of Pancho Villa 1916-1917," Journal of the 
Historical Society of the Georgia National Guard, available from http://www.hsgng.org/pages/pancho.htm; 
accessed 2 June 2006. 
62 The use of bombs and missiles rather than ground troops against terrorist organizations, such as the 
reprisal attack against Libya in 1986 and the use of tomahawk missiles in Afghanistan after the 1998 US 
embassy bombings, is discussed in Chapter VI.   
63  William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice 
(Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996), 333.  
64 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 1.  
65 In the raid on Entebbe, the Israelis did target and destroy Ugandan military fighter planes on the 
airfield at Entebbe. The purpose was to prevent the Ugandans from shooting down the rescue force, not as 
an act of provocation against the Ugandan government. McRaven, 333-380.   
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historical precedents for the use of military force against non-state actors and help justify 
a doctrine of military response to non-state threats. 
C. AUTHORIZATION OF MILITARY FORCE  
The US has used force throughout its history to achieve national objectives.  Use 
of force may be based on a formal declaration of war, Congressional authorization 
without a declaration of war, or on orders by the President as Commander in Chief.66  
There have been eleven declarations of war issued by Congress at the request of the 
President.  Most American military actions have been Congressionally authorized 
without a formal declaration of war.67    
 The use of force became complicated after World War II, when US presidents 
deployed troops for various purposes and the nation found itself in long, drawn out 
conflicts without Congressional authorization or oversight.  An attempt by Congress to 
regain its authority came at the end of the Vietnam conflict, in 1973, with passage of the 
War Powers Resolution (also called the War Powers Act of 1973).68  The War Powers 
Resolution attempts to forbid the President from dispatching military forces for long 
duration involvements without consent of the Congress.  The resolution's mandates 
include a requirement that the President report to Congress within 48 hours after the 
deployment of military forces and limits on how long troops can remain engaged without 
Congressional approval. The War Powers Resolution has not been subject to judicial 
review by the US Supreme Court, and its constitutionality is open to interpretation.  
Presidents interpret the various provisions of the Resolution as unconstitutional 
limitations on their authority. However, by allowing the President to commit troops 
without prior Congressional approval, the War Powers Resolution tacitly acknowledges 
the President's authority to deploy troops. By allowing the deployment of troops without 
                                                 
66 See the discussion of the War Powers Resolution, below. 
67 The declaration of war brings with it changes in the powers of the President; Congress is therefore 
hesitant to issue formal declarations of war. See Jennifer K. Elsea and Richard F. Grimmett, Declarations 
of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 August 2006), 29; available from 
www.crsdocuments.com; accessed 22 August 2006. 
68 An online version of the resolution is available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/warpower.htm, accessed 3 October 2006.  For a detailed analysis of 
the resolution’s mechanics see Elsea and Grimmett, 30. For an evaluation of how the War Powers 
Resolution has been used or avoided by the President see Richard F. Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: 
Presidential Compliance (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2004); 
available from www.crsdocuments.com; accessed 29 August 2006.  
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a formal declaration of war or prior Congressional authorization, the War Powers 
Resolution permits short-duration operations in the national interest.  
 The War Powers Resolution was not called into play for the invasions of 
Afghanistan or Iraq because these invasions were conducted with Congressional 
authorization:  PL-107-40, "Authorization to Use Force Against Those Responsible for 
9/11"69 and PL-107-243, "Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution of 2002."70  The first measure, calling for the use of military force against 
Afghanistan, departs from America's previous declarations of force. It is the first time 
since World War II that the US identified individuals and a non-state group as military 
targets.71    
 Controversy over using military force against non-state actors is nothing new.  
The Congressional Research Service report, "Terrorism: U. S. Response to Bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction?" concisely sums up the pros and cons of 
some such uses of military force.  Although evaluation of such arguments is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it is appropriate to note them here: 
Arguments in favor of a proactive deterrent policy.  Such a policy: (1) 
shows strength and world leadership--i.e., other nations are less inclined to 
support leaders that look weak and act ineffectively; (2) provides  
disincentives for other would be terrorists; (3) is more cost-effective by 
thwarting enemy actions rather than trying to harden all potential targets, 
waiting for the enemy to strike, and suffering damage; (4) may truly 
damage or disrupt the enemy--dry up his safehavens--sources of funds and 
weapons and limit his ability to operate, and (5) provides governments 
unhappy with the U.S. response an incentive to pursue bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic and law enforcement remedies to remain active 
players. 
 
                                                 
69Public Law 107–40—SEPT. 18, 2001 "To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against 
those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States." Available from 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ040.107.pdf; accessed 8 August 2006.  
70 Public Law 107–243—OCT. 16, 2002 “To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against 
Iraq.” Available from http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107 _cong_public_ 
laws&docid =f:publ243.107.pdf;  accessed 8 August 2006. 
71 Richard F. Grimmett, Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 
107-40): Legislative History (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 January 2006), 6; 
available from www.crsdocuments.com; accessed 29 August 2006.  
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Arguments against a proactive military/covert operations oriented 
deterrent terrorism policy.  Such a policy: (1) undermines the rule of law, 
violating the sovereignty of nations with whom we are not at war ; (2) 
could increase, rather than decrease, incidents of terrorism at least in the 
short run; (3) leaves allies and other nations feeling left out, or 
endangered--damaging future prospects for international cooperation; (4) 
may be characterized as anti-Islamic, and (5) may radicalize some 
elements of populations and aid terrorist recruitment; and (6) may result in 
regrettable and embarrassing consequences of mistaken targeting or loss 
of innocent life.72 
To summarize, not all military incursions are acts of war.  International law and 
the precedents of previous military actions against non-state actors should form the 
foundation of America's military response to terrorism.  It appears that military 
operations in self defense or retaliation against non-state terrorists in countries where the 
national government is unable or unwilling to pursue them is within US national right and 
consistent with international law, although certainty on these matters would require 
extensive review by a variety of experts in international law and diplomacy. 
                                                 
72 Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism: US Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy 
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IV. THE USE OF THE CIA AND COVERT OPERATIONS 
The National Security Act of 1947 radically restructured the departments and 
agencies of the US government and created the CIA as an intelligence collection and 
analysis organization.73 The CIA was composed of various previously-existing 
organizations.  The most famous, the legendary Office of Strategic Services (OSS), had 
conducted activities as part of the military in WWII ranging from intelligence collection 
and analysis to covert and commando operations.  The CIA's supporters believed that 
while "operations" took place during war, the intelligence function should be conducted 
in war and peace.74   
Although its charter mandated collection and analysis of intelligence, the CIA 
later developed a covert operations capability.  This seems to have been by default rather 
than by design, as the State Department and the military both lacked the desire and 
capability to conduct covert operations.75  Ever since the CIA developed its paramilitary 
capability, decision makers have had the option of bypassing the legal and bureaucratic 
protocols for using the military and calling instead on the CIA for military-type 
operations.76  This chapter presents various concerns about US reliance on the CIA and 
covert operations.  As CIA operations are covert, information about them is hard to come 
by, and much of it is classified. This chapter is based on news reports and other 
information in the public domain which may not provide a comprehensive view of the 
situation. 
A. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF COVERT CAPABILITY 
 Reliance on the CIA for military-type missions is an arrangement resulting from 
the laws and authorities governing the CIA and the military.  The parameters regulating 
                                                 
73 For a good history of the CIA, see John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA 
(New York: Touchstone, 1987).  See also Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of 
Intelligence (New York: Knopf, 1974) and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard 
Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1983).   
74 Ranelagh, 109.   
75 Ranelagh, 116. 
76 An example, discussed below, is the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA role in the Iran-Contra affair is 
less clear, but the affair overall illustrates problems with covert operations, in this case directed by 
members of the National Security Council staff. See the Report of the President's Special Review Board 
(the Tower Commission Report).  
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how each is employed are based in the United States Code; the military is governed 
primarily by Title 10, "Armed Forces," and the CIA by Title 50, "War and National 
Defense."77  There are many differences between the two, but the crux of the matter is 
that the use of the military is subject to more Congressional involvement and oversight.  
Although the President is supposed to notify the Congressional intelligence committees 
when he directs the CIA to conduct operations, in comparison with the CIA, the military 
is employed in a more rigorous and transparent process.78  The three methods of 
authorizing military use of force all involve mechanisms for Congressional approval (or 
disapproval) and, in the case of the War Powers Resolution, limits on the duration of 
operations.  Under the provisions of Title 50 in the US Code, Congress has a less direct 
role in authorizing or rejecting the President's use of the CIA for covert operations. 
 Another reason for the paradigm of using the CIA instead of the military is the 
former's flexibility in conducting operations.  By design, the CIA is a leaner, more 
vertically integrated organization that communicates and makes decisions faster than the 
military. This, combined with the CIA’s use of surrogates, lets it move quickly and tailor 
the organization and the force to suit each particular operation.  In contrast, the military 
approach is to assign an existing organization or group of organizations to a mission and 
to operate under an existing doctrine that may or may not be the best match for the 
problem. In confidential interviews with the author, CIA officials point out that because 
the CIA is flexible, uses a much smaller organization than the military, maintains a low 
profile, and has demonstrated competence in covert paramilitary operations, the CIA has 
developed a reputation in operations that generally inspires confidence.  The CIA came 
under fire from all directions for its Cold War intelligence failures, most notably the 
failure to see that the USSR was on the brink of collapse. The choice of the CIA to lead 
                                                 
77 An updated electronic version of the US Code is available from 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/; accessed 18 April 2005.  
78 Since 1974, Congress has required that the President issue a "finding" that "each such operation is 
important to the national security of the United States and report[ing] in a timely fashion a description and 
scope of such operation [sic] to the appropriate committees of Congress." Classified Presidential findings 
"are to be reported to the [Congressional] Intelligence Committees as soon as possible after being approved 
and before the initiation of the covert action authorized by the finding." Relyea, 12-13. 
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the US invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates that despite those problems, the agency still 
is seen as the force of choice, even in comparison to elite military units.79 
B. INCREASED DEPENDENCE ON COVERT ACTION 
 The US attempt to overthrow the fledgling Castro regime, commonly known as 
the Bay of Pigs, exemplifies a CIA operation that would likely have been a better fit for 
the military.  In that case, the military determined that operational success would take 
hundreds of thousands of troops.  The CIA convinced the Kennedy administration that 
they could do the mission with 1,800 men formed into a surrogate force.80  Accounts of 
                                                 
79The development of similar capabilities in the CIA and special DOD units tends to focus attention on 
questions of which units might be more competent. This obscures the larger question of the ease of 
authorizing deployments for each type of unit. In short, it is more difficult to send special units on a 
mission than it is to get the CIA to do it.  See Douglas C. Waller, The Commandos: The Inside Story of 
America's Secret Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 201-224. 
80 Although consideration of surrogate forces is beyond the scope of this thesis, a few comments on 
the topic are in order. In states where terrorists or extremists are based, the CIA’s use of covert operations 
and surrogate forces differs from overt cooperation between the US government and a partner nation’s 
government insofar as the CIA generally conducts surrogate operations through militias or other unofficial 
paramilitary groups. See Colonel Kathryn Stone, "All Necessary Means":  Employing CIA Operatives in a 
Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US. Army War College, 
2003) and International Crisis Group, "Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" Africa 
Report, 95, 11 July 2005. Available from 
www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/095_counter_terrorism_in_somalia.pdf; 
accessed 22 September 2005.   
 At times the US will supplement American military forces with surrogate forces to prevent a 
seemingly weak host nation from appearing overrun, thus averting awkward questions about national 
sovereignty. A well-known example is the use of irregular and surrogate forces in Vietnam.  The 
cooperation between the military and the CIA and the similarity of their missions can cause confusion 
about which organization is conducting which mission under what authorities.  US operations in Vietnam 
and Laos exemplify the blurred line between overt US military and covert CIA-backed surrogate forces.   
See Neil Sheehan, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 79. 
 CIA covert operations with surrogate forces is problematic for numerous reasons, including 
inadequate secrecy, the difficulty synchronizing surrogate forces with conventional forces, and problems 
resulting from a lack of legal authority over them. As an example of some unintended effects of using 
surrogate forces, shortly after the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, a Special Forces Master Sergeant told this 
author that SF soldiers should not be surprised that Somalis could down a helicopter with a rocket propelled 
grenade, because 5th Special Forces Group had taught irregular forces that technique in the 1980s.  
Exemplifying lack of discipline are problems with the Contras in Nicaragua, who were accused of human 
rights violations and drug trafficking.  While these charges were neither fully confirmed nor fully 
dismissed, the suspicions cut into American public support for the Contras.  See The Contras, Cocaine, and 
Covert Operations, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2, available from 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm; accessed 21 August 2006.   
 Similarly, developing a host nation's ability to oppose non-state actors within its borders has 
mixed results.  In countries like Pakistan and Columbia, successes are often counteracted by the local 
government’s inability to capture or eliminate non-state terrorist or extremist groups. In Pakistan, a recent 
agreement between the central government and the tribal leaders in Waziristan giving the western 
provinces semi-autonomy has many critics believing that Al Qaeda and the Taliban have immunity there. 
See David Rohde, "Al Qaeda Finds its Center of Gravity," New York Times, 10 September 2006. Available 
from http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00812FD3F550C738DDDA00894DE404482; 
accessed 10 September 2006. 
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decision making in the Bay of Pigs operation indicate that the administration and the 
military found the use of covert force much more palatable than anticipated international 
repercussions of an American military invasion of the island.81  The Bay of Pigs failure 
did not stop the CIA’s covert paramilitary activities, but rather inspired them to work out 
some of the organization's operational issues.82    
 After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the CIA continued covert paramilitary operations 
deemed too risky for overt military involvement.  The growth of the CIA’s covert 
capabilities gave the military a reason to avoid developing a clandestine capability that 
they did not want in the first place.  Concentrating covert programs inside the veiled 
world of the CIA also helped prevent public embarrassment and Congressional battles 
that might impede administration objectives.  The CIA attempts to keep a low profile 
sometimes backfire. Recently, for example, the Italian government issued arrest warrants 
for CIA operatives suspected of abducting a Muslim cleric.83 
 The government’s continued dependence on the CIA for offensive operations 
outside of declared war zones was demonstrated at the beginning of Operation Enduring 
Freedom when, despite Congressional authorization and widespread public sympathy for 
the use of military force, the administration had the CIA conduct the first organizing and 
support operations for the Northern Alliance fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  One 
reason that the CIA was desirable is their prior history in Afghanistan supporting the 
Muhajadeen against the Soviet Union.  Congress authorized use of military force for 
overt actions against Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, but only after the 
CIA was already operating in Afghanistan was the military directed to deploy Army 
Special Forces for operations there. 84    
 
                                                 
81 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 330.  A good overall discussion of the Bay of Pigs can be found in 
Vandenbroucke. 
82 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
83 Craig Whitlock, "Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions: Suspects Possibly Taken to 
Nations that Torture," Washington Post, 13 March 2005, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A30275-2005Mar12.html;  accessed 29 September 2006. 
84 Schroen discusses the preliminary operations of Operation Enduring Freedom as well as the 
background of CIA involvement in Afghanistan.      
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C. CIA-DOD RELATIONS 
The decision to use the CIA first in the war against Al Qaeda seems to continue 
the general national security paradigm of using the CIA for small scale direct action 
interventions and using the military for air strikes and large conventional operations. 
Ironically, the CIA’s limited operational capability has been bolstered by military 
personnel detailed to the CIA to conduct or support paramilitary operations.85  The 
predator missile attacks against Al Qaeda in the horn of Africa, covert operations 
purportedly conducted by the CIA, seem to confirm other claims of a working 
relationship between the CIA and the military.86  Detailing personnel from the military to 
the CIA for various duties has been common practice.87  Interviews with a variety of 
sources, including retired high-ranking Special Forces and Special Operations officers 
and CIA officials, indicate that the arrangement works well, providing the CIA with 
capabilities it needed and allowing the military to use its special operations capabilities, 
with the added benefit of increasing DoD-CIA collaboration. 
D. COVERT VERSUS OVERT OPERATIONS 
 Focusing on the use of covert operations, the question arises whether covert or 
overt operations against non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are the most productive, 
in the broader strategic sense. Covert and clandestine operations are valuable tools to 
achieve US national objectives. Covert techniques to gather intelligence and to locate, 
track and target non-state actors are a necessity.  In fact, the US military is increasing its 
capabilities for covert and clandestine operations at a pace some critics find 
unwarranted.88   
                                                 
85 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Says a Covert Force Hunts Hussein," New York Times, 
7 November 2003. The article discusses the close relationship between the CIA and SOF.  It is very likely 
that there is a much larger program of collaborative effort between SOF and the CIA that involves detailing 
SOF forces to the CIA, as Schroen writes in First In. 
86 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 
2004), 220-222. Clarke discusses the collaboration between the military and the CIA in the CIA’s use of 
military predators.      
87 The subject of military personnel detailed to the CIA for operations is discussed in many books and 
articles.  The process of being assigned to the CIA, described by Schroen, is confirmed by retired Special 
Forces officers interviewed by the author. See First In, 215.  
88 William Arkin, "The Secret War: Frustrated by Intelligence Failures, the Defense Department is 
Dramatically Expanding its 'Black World' of Covert Operations," Los Angeles Times, 27 October 2002.  
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 The key is finding the correct balance of overt and covert operations.  While there 
are many benefits to pursuing US objectives with covert operations and paramilitary 
surrogate forces, CIA covert operations may not be the primary tactic of choice for the 
engagement of non-state actors in every phase of the long war.  In the long war, 
sometimes called a "war of ideas," the use of overt military force may better promote the 
impression of US resolve than covert activity in which the responsible party remains at 
best a matter of speculation. A war of ideas requires using "soft power" to influence 
people's attitudes to reject violent extremism; soft power refers to cultural exchange, 
diplomacy, economic initiatives, information operations, and the like. 89  Ironically, in a 
war of ideas, overt use of force may be more persuasive and do more to influence 
international public opinion than covert operations. The details of whether in any 
particular instance covert or overt activities are preferable would require examination of 
each case by experts in strategy and foreign policy. This thesis argues that using the US 
military in overt operations outside of combat zones is an appropriate weapon to be 
included in the arsenal for the long war, and it should not be automatically assumed that 
in areas outside of combat zones, nonmilitary covert operations are the only or the best 
option.  
                                                 
89 The long war is called a "war of ideas" in a variety of sources, including the Heritage Foundation, 
the BBC and DefenseLink news. The emphasis on indirect means to counter terrorism in the National 
Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism is consistent with the "war of ideas" approach. 
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V.  THE USE OF SOF FORCES AND THE ROLE OF USSOCOM 
 Offensive operations of the sort under consideration in this thesis are not 
conducted partly, it seems, because there are not enough SOF forces to satisfy all 
requirements.90  To fully understand how and why SOF forces are employed, one must 
examine the system that governs their operation.  This chapter describes the current use 
of SOF forces, the changing role of USSOCOM in the context of Title 10, the Unified 
Campaign Plan and other policies, and other challenges facing USSOCOM as lead in the 
global war.  
A. TITLE 10 AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 
 Sources estimate that 85 to 90 percent of SOF forces are committed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, raising the question whether their current use maximizes their strategic 
value in the long war.91 Such a high percentage of the military’s SOF forces are 
dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan because the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
commander has been apportioned these forces, with complete control over their use as 
well as the duration of their stay in the theater.  
 It is a misconception that the USSOCOM has full control over SOF forces in 
combat.  In reality, USSOCOM does not command and control the employment of SOF 
forces except in extraordinary circumstances. (The exception would be a special mission 
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense as identified in Title 10).  In fact, 
USSOCOM does not have the legal authority to transfer and reemploy forces as it 
determines necessary, and has no command responsibility over the missions SOF forces 
receive once they deploy from the US into a particular theater.   
 The distribution of forces is approved by the Secretary of Defense, reflecting 
national military priorities. The CENTCOM commander's authority and control is based 
in Title 10 of the US Code, which establishes the legal chain of command from the 
President through the Secretary of Defense to the regional Geographical Combatant 
                                                 
90 Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet 
Expanded Role (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, July 2006), 15.  Available from 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-812; accessed 14 September 2006. The report discusses issues 
leading to the authorization of four additional Special Forces battalions.  
91 The estimates of troop deployments are reported in United States Special Operations Command, 
Posture Statement (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 5.   
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Command (GCC), as described in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).92  This system 
effectively makes the GCC a separate and distinct entity that essentially answers to the 
Secretary of Defense and no other military officer.93   
 The US National Military Strategy divides the globe into geographic regions, each 
controlled by a single military commander with supreme control over all military forces 
in that region.  The design is intended to unify activities under one commander to ensure 
that all military efforts are synchronized.94  Its primary shortcoming, discussed below, is 
that it does not address non-state threats that operate in more than one region or move 
across regions.  The regional system, which the military has embraced for the last half of 
the 20th century, is not designed to allow one combatant command to manage and execute 
a unified global strategy.   
B.  ORIGINS OF USSOCOM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GCCS 
 USSOCOM was created in 1986 by the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the 1987 
Defense Reorganization Act, Public Law 99-661, commonly known as the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. It was established not as a war fighting command but rather as an 
administrative command, to ensure that skills, equipment and training needed by SOF 
forces would be kept up to date.95  In the twenty years since its creation, USSOCOM has 
played a relatively minor role in national security strategy. 
 The original intent of USSOCOM made it the focal point for issues relating to 
military special operations.  Originally, USSOCOM oversaw matters specific to special 
operations, including equipment procurement, training standards and allocation of the 
                                                 
92 See the Unified Command Plan (Washington, DC: The White House, 1 March 2005); see also the 
Joint The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993 (Washington, DC: History Office, Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff); available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine /jel/history/ucp.pdf; accessed 4 
September 2006.  This author is not alone in questioning the UCP reliance on GCCs.  See Kelly Houlgate, 
"A Unified Command Plan for a New Era," Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2005; available from 
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_0905_Uni,00.html; accessed 2 August 2006. 
93 Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 6, Paragraph 161 establishes the chain of command while 
paragraph 167 dictates the circumstances in which the USSOCOM commander commands an operation.  
The exception is discussed above. 
94 In Victory on the Potomac, Locher details the European Command (EUCOM) chain of command 
structure in 1983 when terrorists bombed the US embassy in Lebanon, pointing to the EUCOM 
commander’s lack of control over units entering his theater and their operations there.  On this example 
Locher writes, “Washington was bypassing EUCOM to a much greater extent than either [then-
Commander of EUCOM] Rogers or [Admiral] Long imagined.  An investigation uncovered thirty-one units 
in Beirut that reported directly to the Pentagon.” Locher, 158.   
95 Marquis, 145. 
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SOF specific budget for all of the armed services.  The command prepared and equipped 
the services’ special operations forces, which were then incorporated into the regional 
commanders' engagement strategies and war plans.  The system worked well, as 
USSOCOM provided subordinate functions in support of the services and the other 
GCCs.  When issues arose with the employment or stationing of SOF units, USSOCOM, 
lacking direct control over SOF forces in the GCC regions and without budget powers to 
influence the situation, could only make recommendations to the GCCs.  
 The geographic approach embodied in the GCC is so strong because of changes to 
the military’s command system engineered by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.96  
Historically, the military prefers to change its structure incrementally, with relatively 
minor adjustments to the existing structure.97 Goldwater-Nichols produced the most 
widespread and influential changes to the military since the National Security Act of 
1947.  Goldwater-Nichols did much to overhaul the organization and regulations 
governing the military and DoD, including reforms to integrate the services into joint 
force commands for interservice operations and the strengthening of GCC authorities and 
responsibilities.  The following year, the Cohen-Nunn amendment to the DoD 
Authorization Act of 1987 created USSOCOM.  
 As the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate, the revised command 
system works well for conventional symmetric state-based conflicts. It is a good way to 
manage large complex conflicts incorporating the full spectrum of military forces.   Most 
conventional conflicts involving the US have not crossed geographic regions, so there 
have been few issues with synchronizing between regions.  Were a conventional conflict 
to spread from one region to another, as in WWII, each GCC would handle the military 
aspects of the conflict in his particular region as he saw fit.    
 Despite its strengths, the current UCP system is ill-equipped to address non-state 
enemies that are networked and connected in subtle, obscure yet effective ways for 
                                                 
96 The military has resisted external change throughout its history, and including various reform 
attempts prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.  Congress began to raise questions soon after the failed 
American hostage rescue in Iran, but changes to the GCC command structure took six years.  The delay 
was due partly to Congressional slowness and partly to military resistance to externally-mandated change. 
97 Marquis, 73. She provides a thorough description of the process of examining and revitalizing SOF 
from the failed Iranian hostage rescue through the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.    
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worldwide operations.98  Non-state organizations are not big, highly-visible armies.  
They are typically small, tight-knit cells with good operational security that makes 
infiltrating and surveilling them extremely difficult.99  Locating and tracking small 
groups and individuals on a global scale is difficult for the US intelligence community.  
Because US military strategy fails to address the geographic interconnectivity of non-
state extremist networks, it fails to deal with them on a global level.  For the military to 
fulfill the concept of a synchronized global campaign against terrorists and extremist 
groups, it will need to improve organizational mechanisms for USSOCOM to conduct 
global operations.100 
C. CHALLENGES TO USSOCOM IN THE LONG WAR 
 The administration envisioned USSOCOM as a global command to counter a 
global enemy.101   However, the mandate for USSOCOM runs counter to a half century 
of military operation and organization and especially to the trend of the past twenty years.  
The 2001 transformation of USSOCOM from a support command to a combatant 
command is inconsistent with its core organizational functions, and Rumsfeld’s intent 





                                                 
98 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 8. 
99 Sageman discusses extremist and terrorist groups' tight networks and difficulty of penetrating and 
monitoring them. See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Guilford, CN: McGraw-Hill, 
2004), 152.  
100 Directives allowing USSOCOM to conduct global operations by the President or the Secretary of 
Defense are unusual, historically confined to a limited set of clandestine missions. Since the early 1980s, 
sources outside the government claim that a small subset of SOF operatives has been responsible for 
hostage rescue, counterterrorism and counter proliferation when the latter two missions were a relatively 
small part of US defense policy. According to independent sources these units operate outside the GCC 
system at the will of the President or the Secretary of Defense for these missions.  See Stephen Emerson, 
Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putman’s Sons, 
1988), 26 and Waller, 228. 
101 Bradley Graham, "Shortfalls of Special Operations Command are Cited," Washington Post, 17 
November 2005.  
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odds with its original Title 10 administrative responsibilities.102  The difficulty of the 
transformation explains why USSOCOM has taken some time to fully embrace its new 
mandate.103  
  Three main issues with the current regional system prevent USSOCOM, as a 
single command, from effectively managing a global campaign.  First, the regional GCCs 
report to, and receive orders from, the President, through the Secretary of Defense.  
Because of the GCCs' autonomy, USSOCOM cannot order a GCC to conduct operations 
in his theater.104  The chain of command, legal framework, and traditional military 
culture all prevent one GCC from being subordinate to another.  This "separate and 
equal" GCC approach, appropriate for symmetric fights against other nation states, slows 
execution of missions against non-state actors. Second, SOF forces stationed in or 
deployed to a particular geographic region fall under the exclusive control of the GCC.105  
Even if all GCCs agreed that USSOCOM should conduct unilateral operations, those 
agreements would be temporary at best and could be dissolved in an instant, as they 
would be subordinate to the provisions of Title 10.  The use of temporary agreements is 
not conducive to long term planning.  Finally, current and former military planners note 
that additional complications arise over which command should be responsible for 
support and logistics functions and who would have legal authority over the forces.106      
 The complex give and take between USSOCOM and the GCCs provides no 
solution to these problems.  There have been proposals that USSOCOM become a fifth 
service, or leave the military all together and become an independent agency like the 
CIA.  One of the most credible critics of the current interagency efforts against non-state 
                                                 
102 Zegart, 223. In Chapter 8, she discusses the evolution of agencies and the issues they face when 
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Act of 1986, page 1012.    
105 Public Law 99-433, page 1013.  
106 These concerns were presented by active-duty and retired military offices in interviews with the 
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actors, Michael Vickers, suggests that all efforts to combat non-state organizations should 
be lumped together under one interagency clandestine service command.107  These 
proposals ignore the requirement that SOF forces integrate with the rest of the military 
during major conflicts.  SOF nests into the larger military strategy and plays an integral 
part in the force which a regional commander has at his disposal.  The difficulty comes in 
creating a "dual use" system which would allow SOF to operate independently for special 
missions against non-state actors and also seamlessly integrate with the rest of the 
military during conventional conflicts with nation states.     
D. CURRENT SOF MISSIONS 
 The US military has proven itself the most effective fighting force in history, but 
in small scale asymmetric or SOF-focused operations, improvements are necessary.  
Reducing the number of SOF forces committed to Iraq and Afghanistan so they are 
available for deployment elsewhere would be a first step in empowering USSOCOM to 
conduct global offensive counterterrorist operations.108  As one Special Forces officer 
said of the over commitment of Army Special Forces, “Something needs to be done to 
quench the conventional commanders’ thirst for A-teams.”109  
 Treating a non-state enemy as a regional rather than a global threat provides an 
excuse for a GCC to keep SOF forces in his theater as a contingency, held in reserve or 
used for missions that could be performed by conventional forces.  The GCC system 
prevents USSOCOM from evaluating the need for SOF forces and distributing them 
where they may be better used in irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, or direct 
action missions.110   
                                                 
107 Michael Vickers, "Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems," 
Congressional testimony; available from 
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/T.20060315.ImplementingGWOT/T.20060315.Impleme
ntingGWOT.pdf; accessed on 26 May 2006.  
108 The concept of a unit's commitment to Iraq or Afghanistan does not refer only to the time the unit 
is in theater. It includes also the time required to prepare for deployment and to recover upon return.  
During the cycle, a unit cannot be used for other requirements.   
109 The quote is from a USASOC Special Forces officer interviewed at Fort Bragg.   
110 The author was told that 1st Battalion 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) did not participate in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom because when the CENTCOM commander requested 1/10 SFG(A), the EUCOM 
commander replied that EUCOM needed an SF battalion in Europe as a contingency, and would not release 
them.  The CENTCOM commander eventually took 3rd Battalion 3rd Special Forces Group (A) to 
supplement the 10th SFG(A), which had already been apportioned to him.  This incident was related by an 
appropriately-placed Special Forces officer in an interview.    
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 The primary missions for SOF forces in Afghanistan and Iraq focus on capturing 
or killing insurgent leaders (High Value Targets, or HVTs), along with related activities 
to facilitate these missions.111  Conventional units' experience and capabilities after five 
years of combat should allow them to assume at least some SOF missions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.112  At the same time, a transition of this nature would be in keeping with DoD 
senior leadership’s desire to transform the military and make it more SOF-like.   
Relieving SOF forces from their current responsibilities would permit SOF “combat 
multipliers” to pursue terrorist networks outside of Afghanistan, Iraq and the CENTCOM 
region, and SOF forces could be positioned to conduct offensive operations against 
terrorist targets if appropriate.   
E. CURRENT USSOCOM PRIORITIES 
 Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to make USSOCOM the global command for 
countering non-state enemies seemed appropriate immediately following the 9/11 
attack.113  Since receiving its new mandate, USSOCOM has been evolving to focus on 
targeting and tracking HVTs.114  USSOCOM activities outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 
now emphasize developing “actionable intelligence” with enough detail so the 
USSOCOM commander can develop a plan, synchronize its execution and initiate an 
operation against a time-sensitive target to interdict an individual or disrupt an 
operation.115  Interviews with both Pentagon and USSOCOM officials suggest that the 
regional GCCs are comfortable with allowing USSOCOM to take the lead in this activity.  
 
                                                 
111 Seymour M. Hersh, "Moving Targets," New Yorker, 15 December 2003; available from 
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112 See the interview with Major General James W. Parker, Commander, JFK Special Warfare Center 
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113 Author interview with Robert Andrews, Principal Assistant to the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.    
114 George A. Crawford, Manhunting: Reversing the Polarity of Warfare (unpublished book 
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This might be crucial for an issue apparently neglected in the UCP and the GCC 
strategies:  the command relationship and the linkage between information collection and 
operations.116  
  There is a gap between USSOCOM's mission to plan and synchronize the long 
war and its power to direct forces to execute operations, because USSOCOM must leave 
the execution of most operations to the regional GCCs.  Conversely, SOF forces are not 
controlled by those who can most capably direct their operations with actionable 
intelligence.  The principle of unity of command is violated when a GCC commands SOF 
forces in his theater against a terrorist target on which the actionable intelligence has been 
collected by USSOCOM.  Because the elements who locate targets and those who 
interdict them are not in the same command, the situation presents a high probability of 
communications and synchronization problems.117  If the linkage between actionable 
intelligence and operations were tighter—if USSOCOM controlled its own forces—the 
long war could be pursued more efficiently. 
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VI. RISK AVERSION 
 In September 2006, in a television interview, President Clinton asserted that he 
had wanted to send Special Forces into Afghanistan to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden 
after the 1998 embassy bombings.  According to the President, US military commanders 
opposed it.  “The entire military was against sending Special Forces into Afghanistan and 
refueling by helicopter," Clinton stated. "And no one thought we could do it otherwise, 
because we could not get the CIA and the FBI to certify that Al Qaeda was responsible 
while I was President.” 118  
 Why would military leaders resist such a mission? Opposition to the use of SOF 
or conventional ground troops for offensive operations against non-state actors outside of 
combat zones seems based on more than just concerns about possible international 
repercussions. This chapter considers a contentious issue:  aversion to military risk and 
failure.119   
A. LEGACY OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE FAILURE 
 On November 4, 1979, as the US-backed regime of Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi was coming to an end, masses of Iranian civilians overran the US embassy in 
Tehran, taking 63 embassy personnel hostage.120  The US began diplomatic and political 
efforts to secure their release. The world watched as the crisis dragged on, until six 
months later the military notified the President that they were ready for a rescue mission 
and President Carter authorized American SOF forces to rescue the embassy personnel 
with Operation Eagle Claw.121     
 A long-range rescue mission conducted by the foremost military in the world 
seemed a logical option in light of the Israeli commandos' successful rescue of Israeli 
civilians at Entebbe four years earlier.  The US mission met with problems from the start, 
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and the commander was forced to abort the mission when a helicopter broke down at the 
Iranian desert staging area known as Desert One, leaving the rescue force unable to get 
the hostages out of the embassy.  As the rescue force prepared to depart, two aircraft 
collided, killing eight crewmembers.  The US rescue forces departed the chaos of Desert 
One in disarray, leaving behind classified information, the wreckage of several aircraft 
and, most importantly, the bodies of American servicemen.  The raid, known as Desert 
One, was an extreme embarrassment for the US and the military. As Mark Bowden writes 
of the affair, "It was a debacle.  It defined the word 'debacle.'"122       
 The failed mission caused international humiliation for the US, led to Carter's 
defeat in the 1980 election, and deepened the conventional military's mistrust of SOF 
forces.123  The military prepared for a second Iranian hostage rescue mission, but it was 
never seriously considered by civilian leaders.  The hostage rescue failure dramatically 
reduced the chances that SOF would be approved for another such raid in any context.124   
 Aversion to risk and fear of failure, destruction and death have always been part 
of modern military culture. These values became more salient to Americans after the 
Iranian hostage disaster. Risk aversion and cautiousness are reflected in the military's 
"zero defects" attitude and the Powell doctrine. 
B. ZERO DEFECTS MENTALITY 
 The concept of "zero defects" originated in business. It was originally intended to 
enforce high standards but was revealed to be counterproductive.  The military became 
especially focused on quality control in the 1970s, when there were concerns about the 
quality of the individuals in the force.  During the post-Vietnam drawdown, the military 
needed to cut its ranks.  The approach was simple: keep the best and let the rest go.   The 
"only the best" mentality led to excessive pressure on service members.  They strove for 
the top, but problems developed because to protect service members' careers, 
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performance ratings were inflated, and problems and mistakes were not reported.125  The 
term "zero defects mentality" is now used more generally, to indicate unwillingness to 
tolerate any errors or inadequacies in any aspect of the military. 
 Some of the military's difficulties in dealing with non-state actors and smaller 
targets may result from military leaders' fear of repeating a humiliating failure like Desert 
One.  The zero defects mentality seems to reinforce the military's reticence to use SOF 
forces for risky, high-profile combat operations of the sort discussed in this thesis.126    
 The caution in committing military forces is further complicated by how the 
military views combat attrition.  Military planners project casualty and loss rates on based 
on historical data.  Most of the data originated with WWII. It generally indicates that 
smaller forces have higher casualty rates, which reinforces the military's dependence on 
large contingents of troops to insure victory.127   Stories about the planning for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom are filled with struggles between the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 
desire to use the smallest number of forces possible and the CENTCOM commander and 
the Joint Chiefs wanting a large force to ensure victory with a safe margin of error.128  
The Project on Defense Alternatives reports that CENTCOM commander General 
Tommy Franks rejected a proposal that SOF forces initiate the military attack on Iraq, as 
had been done in Afghanistan.129   It is unclear if this was due to concerns about SOF 
forces in particular, or doubts that a small force could defeat the Iraqis' larger and better 
equipped conventional army.  
 One planner for Operation Iraqi Freedom, LTC Douglas Macgregor, proposed 
extremely small force compositions. His suggestions were rejected out of hand by the 
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CENTCOM commander and staff.130  Macgregor, known for his theory on reducing the 
size of land forces, believes military dependence on large heavy forces is a remnant of 
industrial age thinking and strategy.  In his view, new technological developments that 
might reduce dependence on large forces in the 21st century have not yet been fully 
integrated by the Army.131  Macgregor suggests that the military can conduct 
conventional missions with smaller forces because of improved weapons and information 
systems. In his view, the Army has the right technology, but is overcautious in requiring 
large numbers of troops for conventional engagements. 
C. THE POWELL DOCTRINE 
 The military's hesitance to deploy forces is not based solely on concerns for 
failure or defeat. It also involves questions about the proper employment of the 
military—the use of the services in ways appropriate to their capabilities.  In 1992, 
General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his view on 
using military force.  The evolving philosophy, the Powell doctrine, is basically a series 
of  considerations to determine if the use of military force is appropriate.132  The Powell 
doctrine seeks to provide clarity to civilian and military leaders, so they can employ 
forces against a clear and distinct enemy, and with a clear and distinct mission, to prevent 
long, drawn out military involvements like Vietnam or questionable employments like 
Somalia.133  
D. BIAS FAVORING AIR ATTACKS OVER GROUND OPERATIONS 
 For the reasons outlined above, the military is unenthused about using military 
force for anything other than its core missions in the context of conventional symmetric 
nation state warfare. There also seems to be a distinct imbalance in military perception of 
the use of ground versus air forces. The use of ground forces denotes a higher level of 
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commitment and risk. It is more likely to be interpreted as a zero-sum proposal than is the 
use of air forces.134  If ground forces are used and fail, the investment and risk appear to 
be greater, and the mission is more easily deemed a failure.  When air forces or missiles 
are used, some possible outcomes—the failure to destroy the target, or the production of 
collateral damage—are deemed undesirable but nonetheless acceptable.  The failure to 
kill Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 1986, the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy 
in Serbia in 1999, and the failure to kill Osama Bin Laden in 1998 with tomahawk 
missiles fired into Afghanistan received minor notice compared with the Iranian hostage 
rescue and the battle of Mogadishu.   
 Although the 1986 attack on Libya, Operation Eldorado Canyon, was heralded 
publicly as a military success, it was not very effective in military terms. "Apparently 
only four of the eighteen aircraft actually hit their assigned targets," writes one author. 
"Additionally, one Air Force aircraft was lost in the raid (presumably shot down), and 
both crewmen were killed.”135  Yet the poor performance of the air attack did not trigger 
negative consequences as had the deaths of SOF personnel in the battle of Mogadishu.   
Reliance on high tech weaponry appears to make failure more acceptable to civilian 
decision makers and military leaders.        
E. SUMMARY 
 Unless there is a sense of extreme peril or urgency, the small force composition, 
short duration and high risk of SOF operations makes them seem undesirable. Military 
leaders hesitate to recommend them, and civilian decision makers are reluctant to 
approve them.  Limited, short-duration counterterrorist attacks by ground forces are 
likely to be perceived as isolated stand-alone operations and thus judged as successes or 
failures individually, rather than as components of a larger strategy and long term 
campaign.136  This phenomenon is demonstrated clearly in the events and aftermath of 
the battle of Mogadishu.  US forces had conducted half a dozen successful raids, but 
when American soldiers were killed, the entire mission was deemed a failure and halted 
without having accomplished the capture of its primary target, Mohammad Farah Adid.  
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Part of the reason may be that with covert operations that are revealed only after failure, 
the public does not see how the one single disastrous operation fits in to the larger 
campaign. 
 Furthermore, SOF operations are more dependent on individual service members 
to accomplish the mission in comparison to conventional missions using high tech 
weapons like missiles and bombs. In essence, SOF operations are more "personal." The 
use of SOF ground forces to "close with and destroy the enemy" may have a higher 
probability of success than a missile strike, but employing these forces is contrary to the 
military's increasing trend to prefer high tech weapons whenever possible.  Since the US 
military has evolved into the most technologically sophisticated force, in part to reduce 
the risk to individuals, using ground forces to accomplish a mission that might 
theoretically be achieved by a missile or a bomb may appear anachronistic.137   
 The logic of using high tech, stand off approaches to warfare may apply to 
symmetric conflicts, where the destruction of the enemy's military or infrastructure will 
eliminate their ability to fight and force them to surrender.  But the challenges of 
asymmetric warfare are due in part to terrorists' and extremists' networks, to their 
personal connections to each other and to local people, as well as their willingness to 
conduct attacks despite overwhelming odds, and, in the case of suicide missions, despite 
deliberate self-sacrifice.  In order to succeed against this mentality, the US military may 
have to change its own mentality, and reject the "risk averse" trend that has confined its 
operations in the long war to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 This thesis explores four major constraints that make it difficult for the United 
States to conduct overt offensive operations against terrorists and extremists outside of 
combat zones. On the assumption that such operations could be valuable additions to 
military strategy, it is appropriate to suggest changes to remove the barriers to conducting 
them. This chapter considers how each constraint might be mitigated or lessened.  If the 
barriers against such operations were lowered, USSOCOM, as lead command in the long 
war, could conduct a broader range of operations against terrorist and extremist non-state 
actors.  
 The discussion that follows suggests how each recommendation would impact or 
resolve the constraints.  Of course, each recommendation warrants further study and 
development before implementation.138  For each constraint, the recommendations 
presented first lie outside the military’s authority. They would require approval or 
implementation by other actors in government.  The general recommendations are 
followed by military-specific recommendations for change applicable to the Department 
of Defense (in some cases, requiring Congressional or Presidential authorization). 
A. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
 The legal constraints on conducting offensive operations outside of declared war 
zones, described in Chapter III, stem mainly from misconceptions about international law 
and the use of force.  One approach to overcoming such misconceptions is to confront 
them head-on, with information and education. Another approach is to bypass the 
misconception completely, through elaborated or new legal agreements explicit enough 
to overcome any potential misunderstanding. Both approaches are advocated in the 
following recommendations. 
1. General Recommendations 
(a)  To provide governmental transparency to the public, the US Congress should 
consider creating an authority (or amending the War Powers Resolution) to allow the 
President to deploy forces to conduct specific short duration offensive operations against 
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non-state terrorists and extremists outside of designated combat zones. Although such an 
explicit legal authority may not be strictly necessary, it has the potential to clarify US 
policy and increase public and institutional support for such missions.139   
 (b)  The Department of State should consider diplomatic initiatives to secure 
bilateral agreements for US forces to conduct offensive operations against non-state 
actors in coalition with partner nations.  If cross-border operations become necessary, 
such agreements could be expanded to include more countries in order to secure 
approvals for flyover or basing rights. 
 (c)  Civil-military security cooperation in selected partner countries should be 
improved to better target asymmetric non-state threats.  Improved coordination and 
assistance would help partner nations develop their counterterrorist abilities and might 
therefore deter non-state terrorists from operating in those locations.140  Additionally, 
with good preparation and strong ties to the US, partner nations might be more open to 
the types of bilateral agreements proposed above. 
2. Recommendations for DoD  
 (a) DoD should enhance and emphasize, as a component of the Professional 
Military Education system (PME) for mid- and senior-level officers, a unit focusing on 
the use of force in international law and its foundation in the literature on just war.  To 
give staff officers, advisors and commanders a thorough understanding of the legal and 
moral foundations for the use of force, the program of instruction should include 
significant attention to non-state actors.  It might be best incorporated into the 
Intermediate Level Education for conventional military officers at the field grade level, 
with refinement and reiteration of the subject in all PME for the rest of their careers.   
 (b)  For SOF officers in particular, USSOCOM should use the improved PME 
curriculum to prepare personnel to negotiate with partner nation military forces as part of 
larger US negotiation teams seeking agreements to conduct offensive operations.  A 
SOF-specific program on the legal and moral aspects of war would help with irregular 
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warfare campaign planning.  In addition, well-prepared SOF officers would more 
competently discuss legal and political considerations with both civilian leaders and 
military commanders.   
B. RELIANCE ON THE CIA FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS 
 Use of the CIA for covert operations against terrorists and extremists has been 
due to the CIA's speed and flexibility in comparison to the military, described in Chapter 
IV.  The issue is not just the use of the CIA versus the use of US military forces.  A 
complicating factor is the difficulty of calculating the costs and benefits of covert versus 
overt operations against non-state extremists.   
1. General Recommendation 
 The US government should explore using a variety of overt military options, 
including ground forces, against non-state terrorists and extremists outside of combat 
zones. After almost fifty years with the CIA as the force of choice, is difficult to predict 
how civilian decision makers might gain a more positive attitude toward overt military 
operations. At the very least, a policy allowing use of the military for overt offensive 
operations in areas other than combat zones would provide an alternative to CIA covert 
operations. Although there are pros and cons to both overt and covert operations, the 
ability to connect the strategic communications message (American resolve, deterrence, 
etc.) with the use of overt military force might have more benefits than continued reliance 
on covert operations.141       
2. Recommendation for DoD 
 USSOCOM should insure that the training and evaluation exercises for SOF 
forces are realistic and rigorous to insure individual proficiency and keep troops focused 
on tasks relevant to the types of missions discussed in this thesis.  Enhancing training 
protocols to counter the perception that some SOF forces are under prepared might 
improve the reputation of all SOF units among GCCs, the JCS and civilian decision 
makers. Backed by favorable attitudes toward SOF forces, USSOCOM might more easily 
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overcome senior military commanders' and civilian decision makers' hesitation to 
approve offensive counter terrorist missions.142 
C. USSOCOM AND THE USE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
 A complicated command structure designed for regional engagements against 
nation states interferes with the military's ability to deploy forces rapidly and in a flexible 
fashion against non-state actors in areas outside of combat zones, as described in Chapter 
V. Because USSOCOM is the lead command in the long war, the following 
recommendations focus on empowering the command so it may better pursue its 
mandate. 
1. General Recommendation 
 Congress should consider reinstating the five star rank “General of the Armies” 
and should promote the USSOCOM commander to that rank.143  Making the USSOCOM 
commander a five star general would communicate the importance of the effort to 
prosecute the long war in the eyes of DoD and the US government.  A higher rank would 
give the USSOCOM commander the power to compel other GCCs to conduct operations, 
and the authority to conduct operations in any theater. The chain of command would have 
to be balanced by making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a five star general, as 
he is the President's chief military advisor and America's senior uniformed military 
officer. Just as after WWII, the grade of five star general could be eliminated when the 
position becomes unnecessary or when the long war is ended.    
2. Recommendations for DoD 
 (a) The Secretary of Defense should consider giving USSOCOM more control 
over all SOF forces, whether in the US (CONUS) or forward based overseas.144  For 
example, USSOCOM might be given control similar to that exercised by the United 
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) over all US military strategic 
transport aircraft.  USTRANSCOM has the authority to recall strategic air lift assets if 
                                                 
142 The negative attitude toward SOF forces is described in Shultz's "Showstoppers."   
143 This suggestion was made by a USSOCOM officer interviewed by the author. The increase in rank 
would have to be authorized by Congress under Title 10 of the US Code, with additional authorizations 
necessary to support the increased rank.   
144 Sources interviewed by the author report in confidence that there is an initiative to redeploy all 
SOF forces to the continental US so that USSOCOM will have complete control over tasking them.  
Although such an end run around the rules would give USSOCOM more forces in theory, it would not 
eliminate the current command problem of conducting SOF missions in a GCC's theater.    
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they seem underutilized or for higher-priority missions. Similar authority for 
USSOCOM's control of SOF forces would go a long way toward solving USSOCOM's 
manning challenges. Increased authority would allow the USSOCOM commander to 
evaluate the use of SOF forces within a particular GCC region and reallocate them 
elsewhere if appropriate. It might help ensure that conventional commanders use SOF 
forces appropriately in strategic roles.145  Most importantly, increased authority would 
give the USSOCOM commander the flexibility to rapidly deploy and employ forces in a 
time-sensitive situation.146   
 (b)  The Department of Defense should ponder the option of designating 
USSOCOM as the command responsible specifically for ground-based operations outside 
of combat zones.  Although it can be argued that the GCCs are developing contingency 
plans for such operations, having USSOCOM assume primary responsibility would 
relieve the GCCs of a difficult and distracting task and allow them to focus on their 
primary missions.  (An alternative might be to move all long war planning and 
synchronizing functions to USSTRATCOM, freeing USSOCOM to focus on conducting 
operations.)147  The important point, however, is that increasing the authority of 
USSOCOM as the lead command in the long war would improve the connection between 
intelligence collection and operations, thus improving the odds of success in the latter. 
 
 
                                                 
145 These changes might also result in a shift of skill sets for conventional forces. If, in the long term, 
SOF forces do more special missions and conventional forces conduct more of the missions for which SOF 
is now responsible, conventional forces would become more SOF-like.    
146 The system to deploy forces should be easier and faster than the current system. Perhaps something 
like the long duration deployment orders issued to navy groups on multi-destination cruises would allow 
troops to deploy to one country and then, as needed, immediately move to another.  USSOCOM needs 
more flexibility to position, employ and adjust the force. To prevent disruption of USSOCOM operations, 
any procedure authorizing the deployment of forces might have to be accompanied by agreements—
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA)—between the USSOCOM commander and other GCCs.  A similar 
agreement would most likely be needed between DoD and DoS to allow SOF forces the use of DoS 
facilities when necessary.     
147 Having USSTRATCOM as the lead command would let USSOCOM focus more on its most important 
tasks, perhaps including the collection of actionable intelligence.  Like the USSOCOM commander, the 
USSTRATCOM commander is equivalent in rank to the GCCs, so the recommendation that the head of the 
long war be given a five star rank might apply in this scenario as well.  Another alternative—the use of the 
Joint Staff—is unrealistic, as the US military has avoided centralizing all planning activities in the Joint 
Staff. Because this option would likely be unpopular and require Congressional action to restructure their 
duties and responsibilities, it is not recommended here. 
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D. RESISTANCE TO "RISKY" OPERATIONS 
 As discussed in Chapter VI, of all the constraints discussed in this thesis, risk 
aversion is the least concrete. Despite decades of efforts to quantify risk assessment, the 
issues at the heart of risk aversion are more emotional and intuitive than intellectual or 
factual; this makes them difficult to influence with logic and evidence. There are no laws 
or regulations mandating that an organization be adverse or open to risk, and excessive 
caution is not a problem that more equipment or more money will rectify.  Overcoming 
reluctance to employ military forces in risky operations requires an indirect campaign to 
influence attitudes and opinions.   
1. General Recommendations 
 (a)  The government should try to improve its information campaign to educate 
the general public, both domestically and internationally, about the legal and moral use of 
military force, emphasizing that offensive operations are important to the US national 
security strategy against terrorists and extremists.  Better public information could be part 
of an explicit, informed discussion to communicate the validity of these operations as part 
of national security strategy.  The author assumes that unethical, propagandistic, covert or 
illegal efforts to influence public opinion would not be pursued. 
 (b)  Government researchers or independent think tanks should research the 
strategic costs and benefits of taking responsibility for offensive, ground-based SOF 
missions after their completion, whether or not the missions are successful.  Whatever the 
results of the research, substituting knowledge for preconceptions might produce a shift 
in thinking—about overt versus covert and less versus more risky operations—at the 
highest levels of government and ultimately among the general public.     
  (c)  Military advocates, including active and retired military personnel, should 
work to give the American public a realistic view of how individual mission failures and 
personnel losses are an inevitable part of the long war.148  This is difficult to propose.  It 
appears to devalue the lives of individual troops and to contradict the concept of training 
                                                 
148 As discussed in Chapter VI, concern about individual troops is part of what lies behind the Powell 
doctrine and the use of high tech weaponry instead of ground forces. 
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SOF forces to conduct missions without fail.149  Realistically, however, failure is always 
a possibility—a difficult truth to accept.  Totally rejecting the idea of failure and 
disapproving important but risky missions carries its own costs. 150  In addition, accepting 
some failure has symbolic value. Extremists' willingness to sacrifice demonstrates their 
determination.  A similar attitude of resolve and determination in the face of setbacks 
might reenergize America’s commitment to winning the long war. 
2. Recommendations for DoD 
 (a)  The military should embrace the concept that the long war is the most 
important component of US national security strategy, and acknowledge that in 
comparison to nation-state conflicts, asymmetric conflicts with terrorists and extremists 
are less stable and predictable, especially if non-state actors acquire WMDs. Since 
asymmetric threats are so important, senior commanders should be more accepting of 
mission failure, the loss of equipment, even the loss of personnel.  This does not mean 
commanders should excuse incompetence, much less reward it. But as in previous wars, 
one failure does not doom a campaign.  A campaign strategy requires a long term 
perspective, and it should not be treated as a series of unconnected individual operations. 
The military should remember that the campaign against non-state terrorists will continue 
even if some missions fail.   
 (b)  The military should consider how its subculture has evolved from the ideal of 
brave warriors willing to sacrifice themselves for civilians to its current dependence on 
high technology to reduce risk to individual service members.151  With outward 
allegiance to the warrior ethic, the military as an institution nonetheless is dominated by 
                                                 
149  Part of the SOF subculture is the highly competitive emphasis on perfection; it is an extreme 
version of the "zero defects" mentality discussed in Chapter VI.  For a detailed ethnographic description of 
SOF subculture in US Army Special Forces, see A. J. Simons, The Company They Keep: Life Inside US 
Army Special Forces (New York: Avon, 1997). 
150  An interesting counterfactual question arises in this context: What would have been the long term 
effects if President Clinton had not withdrawn US forces from Somalia?  What if he had defied popular and 
political pressure and kept forces in Somalia until Mohammad Farah Adid was captured?  One can only 
speculate how this might have affected US involvement in Rwanda and elsewhere, like the Balkans. 
151 On the psychology and ideology of the American soldier, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier 
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 
and especially Chapter 6, "The Ideological Constant: The Liberal Society versus Military Professionalism," 
143-162. 
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bureaucratic norms that discourage risk-taking.152  The military may have a hard time 
accepting that hazardous offensive operations are central to its mission. Moving the 
military subculture toward that recognition might involve changing the focus of training 
and exercises, and educational campaigns to help military personnel understand the value 
of risky operations.  For many years, recruiting has emphasized the concrete benefits of 
service: monetary bonuses, college education and other economic incentives, technical 
training, adventure and travel, etc., rather than the nobility of risk and sacrifice in service 
to one's country for a just cause. An information campaign may help service members 
accept a different, more heroic view of the military commitment.  
E. CONCLUSION  
 United States national security strategy and its supporting strategies and plans are 
constantly evolving.  This work examines one component of the larger strategy for 
combating terrorism.  There are many programs and initiatives, in development or 
ongoing, to improve national security. While some are classified and cannot be discussed 
here, a literature survey and the author's interviews show no signs that a comprehensive 
program to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists outside combat zones with overt 
military SOF-type operations is under consideration by the Department of Defense or the 
US government.153   
 Offensive military operations of the sort discussed in this thesis should be used 
with great discretion, and perhaps only rarely.  Nonetheless, overt offensive direct action 
missions against non state terrorists and extremists in their safe havens might prove 
valuable in eliminating, disrupting, and deterring threats against the US and its allies. 
 Since its origins in the American Revolution, the military has evolved to defend 
the US and fight its wars. Transformation of the military and other national security 
agencies is a continual process. Sometimes, internal changes occur at the direction of the 
top military or civilian officials; other times, large changes are mandated by Congress as 
                                                 
152 The author's interviews and experience reveal a common perception in the SOF community that 
low and mid-level commanders will assume risk, but high-level commanders are less likely to do so. 
Perhaps the more conservative officers are more successful, or perhaps higher rank brings more cautious 
attitudes toward risk. Such matters are difficult to quantify and may depend on many variables, including 
individuals' concern about career progression, the command environment, and other details of the situation 
and individual personalities. 
153 Mention of offensive operations in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 
6, does not seem correlated with a comprehensive, detailed plan. 
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representatives of the people.  Today, America faces a rapidly changing threat in the form 
of non-state terrorists and extremists. Policymakers and strategists have determined that 
this threat will not be defeated by large conventional military forces, but rather through a 
combination of indirect and direct means.  It is clear that the current industrial age 
military institution is not the right answer. At this point in the long war, the proper 
balance between indirect and direct means is not known, nor is it clear how to balance 
covert and overt operations, large-scale and small-scale operations, stand off and ground 
based operations.  It is hoped that understanding constraints on overt offensive special 
operations-type missions to pursue terrorists into their safe havens in areas outside of 
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ANNEX: INTERVIEWS 
Colonel Kent Bolster, J3 Operations, United States Special Operations Command, 
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
Colonel Kenneth Coons, Director J9, United States Special Operations Command, 
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry, Commander 96th Civil Affairs Brigade, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina 
 
Colonel William Fitz Lee, Senior DoD Representative to the Office of the Coordinator 
for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Department of State, Washington, DC  
 
Colonel Hector Pagan, J-3 Operations, United States Special Operations Command, 
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida  
 
Colonel John Prior, Senior Department of Defense Liaison Officer to the Central 
Intelligence Agency 
 
Colonel Conrad Troutman, J-3 Operations, United States Special Operations Command, 
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida  
 
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Baudette, Joint Staff J-3, Office of the Deputy Director for 
Special Operations, Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Carter Bertone, Joint Staff J-3, Office of the Deputy Director for 
Special Operations, Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel John Burns, Chief United States Army Special Forces Command 
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fort Bragg, North Carolina    
 
Lieutenant Colonel Roger D. Carstens, Special Assistant for Special Operations and 
Homeland Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel George Crawford, J9, Futures Center, United States Special 
Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hudson, Operations Officer United States Army Special 
Operations Command Futures office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis, Special Operations Command, United States 
Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
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Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Martinson, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Operational War Plans 
Division, Department of Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Steven Whitmarsh, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
(SO/LIC), Department of Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Major Robert L. Farmer, Civil Affairs Planner, United States Army Special Operations 
Command Futures Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
 
Major Tim Mulholland, Foreign Emergency Support Team, Department of State, 
Washington, DC 
 
Major John Nutt, Human Resources Command, Department of Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Major Gregory Reck, United States Army 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina   
 
Major Matt Saunders, Human Resources Command, Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC 
 
Master Sergeant Michael Toth, J3 Operations, United States Special Operations 
Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
Robert Andrews, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), Department 
of Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Scott Breassealle, Command Sergeant Major (Retired), Program Manager, AMTI Corp. 
Southern Pines, North Carolina  
 
Steven Bucci, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC 
 
Roger Cressey, Good Harbor Consulting, Washington, DC 
 
George Dudley, Psychological Operations Planner, United States Army Special 
Operations Command Futures Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina  
 
Mark Dunham, Joint Staff J-3, Office of the Deputy Director for Special Operations, 
Department of Defense, Washington, DC  
 





Richard Lamb, Command Sergeant Major (Retired), Advisor, Special Operations Joint 
Information Center, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air 
Force Base, Florida  
 
Geoffrey Lambert, Lieutenant General (Retired) 
 
Mary Lee, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), Department of 
Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee, 
Washington, DC 
 
David McCracken, Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), Department 
of Defense, Washington, DC 
 
Leslie Young, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of 
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